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This paper looks at the impact of trade liberalization on output, factor intensity and labor
productivity of micro enterprises with diﬀerential access to banks. It uses Indian data on
micro enterprises employing fewer than ten workers in the manufacturing sector and ﬁnds that
trade liberalization, measured by a fall in the tariﬀ, is associated with higher enterprise output,
capital-labor ratios and labor productivity in districts with a larger number of bank branches
per capita. Evidence is consistent with strong complementarities between trade liberalization
eﬀects and better access to credit and greater economic dynamism due to greater bank presence
in the enterprise’s location. In addition, the research points to greater likelihood of outsourcing
of production activity to micro enterprises in more open industries. The study highlights the role
of credit market institutions, labor regulation and linkages between micro enterprises and large
ﬁrms in determining the eﬀects of trade liberalization on developing country manufacturing.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F16, J32, L24, O14, O17
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This study analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on micro enterprises and examines if trade
liberalization eﬀects diﬀer with diﬀerential access to banks. It focuses on micro enterprises for various
reasons. First, micro enterprises are labor intensive and employ a large portion of the population in
developing countries. For instance, the share of the unorganized manufacturing sector (household
enterprises and enterprises hiring fewer than ten workers) in total manufacturing employment was 82
percent in 2000-01 for India (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2003). Micro enterprises are credited with
job creation (Berry, 2002 for Latin America) and have elicited numerous subsidies from policy makers
in developing economies, who tout micro and small enterprises to be ‘a powerful force for poverty
reduction’ (World Bank Group Review of Small Business Activities, 2001). Second, micro enterprises
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1have a large presence in developingcountry manufacturing1. They provide inputs to larger ﬁrms in
the formal manufacturing sector2. Their competitiveness lies in relatively low overheads. They
have low capital requirements and operate in geographically localized factor and product markets
(Majumder, 2004 for India). Micro enterprises face low labor costs arising from the lack of burdens
of excessive regulation imposed on larger ﬁrms. Labor laws like provision of worker’s compensation,
severance pay and social security beneﬁts are rarely enforced for these enterprises (Harriss-White
and Sinha, 2007 for India, Aryeetey et al., 1994 for Ghana and Van Diermen, 1997 for Indonesia).
In addition, these enterprises produce diﬀerentiated goods that satisfy consumer demand largely
among poorer sections of the population.
Access to credit for micro entrepreneurs is limited due to the existence of credit market imper-
fections like rationing. This has led policy makers in developing countries to target credit subsidies
to these enterprises through the ﬁnancial system to enable them to improve performance through,
for instance, investment in better technology andm a r k e t i n gt e c h n i q u e s . W hile the literature has
focused on the impact of better access to ﬁnance on the performance of ﬁrms in general, and small
enterprises in particular, few studies look at the role played by better access to ﬁnance in determining
how micro entrepreneurs adapt to greater competition brought about by trade liberalization. Given
the signiﬁcance of the micro enterprise sector for development, its importance in policy, and in light
of the globalization eﬀorts of developing economies in the past few decades, notably in Asia and
Latin America, this is an important question. This study attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature
by looking at the impact of trade liberalization, measured by a fall in the tariﬀ, on the output,
factor use and labor productivity of micro enterprises in the manufacturing sector and by examining
if these trade liberalization eﬀects diﬀer with diﬀering bank presence in the area where the enterprise
is located.
To analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization on micro enterprises, it is posited that the demand
curve for the enterprises’ product is downward-sloping and is a derived demand composed of ﬁnal
demand from the consumer and demand from larger ﬁrms in the formal (or organized or registered)
sector who outsource or sub-contract labor intensive production tasks to the micro enterprise sector.
Trade liberalization produces two responses. First, the enterprise and the ﬁrms in the organized
sector lose some market share due to increased import competition. Second, they perceive a ﬂatter
demand curve due to greater available substitutes for their product. This leads to a downward shift
and ﬂattening of the enterprise’s demand curve. It is argued that in this scenario, enterprises facing
high costs might produce less output while enterprises facing low costs might produce more output
and charge a lower price. Greater bank presence is associated with lower enterprise cost due to
improved access to credit and hence a lower cost of capital. Through its eﬀect on enterprise costs,
the paper argues that it aﬀects output. Additionally, since most micro enterprises operate under a
severe physical space constraint and face the possibility of a substantial increase in labor costs as
they expand and increase their labor input, it is contended here that enterprises in districts with
more banks and better access to credit will employ higher capital-labor ratios and hence see greater
labor productivity with trade liberalization.
In this theoretical set up, outsourcing from larger, formal ﬁrms is not bank dependent, largely
because these ﬁrms have alternate sources of credit like equity and debt markets. One would expect
that it is the more productive, low-cost ﬁrms who outsource production activity to micro enter-
prises. This is because for larger values of output and employment, the beneﬁto fl o w e rl a b o rc o s t s
by outsourcing to micro enterprises outweighs the costs associated with outsourcing. With trade
liberalization, the more productive, low-cost formal ﬁrms expand by charging a lower price and out-
source more to the micro-enterprise sector. This implies higher likelihood of outsourcing to micro
1For Taiwan, Yan Aw (2001) notes that 30 percent of manufacturing ﬁrms between 1981 and 1996 employed fewer
than ﬁve workers. For southern Africa, Daniels (2003) documents that twenty-two percent of the adult population
ﬁfteen years or older were employed in enterprises employing fewer than ﬁfty workers versus only ﬁfteen percent in
registered ﬁrms between 1991 and 1994
2Harriss-White and Sinha (2007) use a computable general equilibrium model of the Indian economy to ﬁnd that
the informal sector fulﬁls forty-three percent of the intermediate demand for the formal sector.
2enterprises with trade liberalization, a hypothesis examined in this study.
The empirical analysis uses data from a large, nationally representative survey on micro household
enterprises and non-household enterprises (enterprises hiring outside workers), who hiring fewer than
ten workers if using power and fewer than twenty workers if not using power in India for the years
1989, 1994 and 2000. These enterprises belong to the unorganized manufacturing sector (sometimes
also called the unregistered or informal manufacturing sector) in India3. India provides a suitable
setting for the study. First, India is one of the few countries with extensive data at the national
level on unorganized manufacturing enterprises that can be employed to answer the questions in
this paper. Second, India undertook extensive trade reforms in 1991 after a balance of payments
crisis led the Indian government to borrow from the IMF4. These reforms were exogenously imposed.
Tariﬀs were brought down drastically across manufacturing industries. The reforms provide a useful
framework to study the impact of trade liberalization on domestic enterprises. Third, India adopts
a policy of directed lending by banks to ‘priority sectors’, including micro enterprises. This enables
the use of information on bank presence to capture access to credit by micro enterprises.
The research exploits crossdistrict variation in bank branches per capita within each Indian state
to examine the diﬀerential eﬀects of trade liberalization on micro enterprises. Using districtlevel
variation allows one to control for unobservable state characteristics that might aﬀect greater bank
presence and the outcome variables of interest simultaneously. Exploiting this geographical variation
also enables one to control for unobservable industryspeciﬁc timevarying shocks aﬀecting tariﬀsa n d
enterprise outcomes simultaneously. Even though it is argued here that the number of bank branches
per capita captures access to credit and a lower cost of capital for enterprises, a greater bank presence
can reduce enterprise costs through an alternate channel. Bank presence is often associated with
greater economic activity, economic dynamism and potential for future growth, all of which result
in agglomeration economies which boost productivity and also lower costs for ﬁrms.
Firmly establishing a causal link between better access to credit through banks and enterprise
outcomes requires randomization in banks across areas with diﬀerential economic activity and poten-
tial for growth. India’s bank expansion was guided by goals of poverty reduction until 1990. Absent
such randomization for the time period spanned by the sample, control variables for economic activ-
ity and prospects for growth at the district level are employed in the estimation. Output per capita
in the unorganized sector and growth in unorganized sector output in the district are used to capture
economic activity and future growth prospects as seen by entrepreneurs and banks respectively. The
expectation is that unorganized sector activity is strongly correlated with overall economic activity.
The research shows that after controlling for the level and growth of economic activity in the district,
bank branches per capita are associated with higher enterprise output, capital-labor ratios and labor
productivity. These results suggest that the channel of greater bank presence being associated with
greater access to credit, thereby lowering the cost of capital for enterprises and leading to diﬀerential
eﬀects of trade liberalization on enterprise outcomes is a plausible one
The results indicate that for household enterprises, a decrease in the tariﬀ is associated with a
decrease in enterprise output and capital-labor ratio in the district with mean bank branches per
capita and with an increase in enterprise output and capital-labor ratio in the district with bank
branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. A 10 percent fall in the tariﬀ is associated with
a 0.4 percent decrease in enterprise output and a 0.6 percent decrease in enterprise capital-labor
ratio in the district with mean bank branches per capita. It is associated with a 1 percent increase
in enterprise output and a 2 percent increase in enterprise capital-labor ratio in the district with
bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. This provides evidence for complementarity
between trade liberalization eﬀects and bank presence. A decrease in the tariﬀ corresponds to a
decrease in output per worker in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district
with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. However, for a 10 percentagepoint
3These enterprises are named diﬀerently in diﬀerent developing countries. For instance, in China, enterprises
employing fewer than seven workers are called ‘Getihu’ translated as ‘Individual Businesses’; see Huang (2008)
4For details on India’s trade reforms, see Mitra and Ural (2008).
3decrease in tariﬀs, the percentage decrease in enterprise output per worker is 2 percentage points
lower in the district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in the district
with mean bank branches per capita. Overall, results for household enterprises are consistent with
strong complementarities between trade liberalization eﬀects and bank presence in the district in
which the enterprise is located.
For non-household enterprises, a decrease in the tariﬀ is associated with an increase in enterprise
output in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district with bank branches
per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. For a 10 percentagepoint decrease in tariﬀs, the percentage
increase in enterprise output is 2 percentage points greater in the district with bank branches per
capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in districts with zero bank branches per capita. A decrease
in the tariﬀ is associated with a decrease in the capital-labor ratio and an increase in output per
worker in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district with bank branches per
capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. For a10 percentagepoint decrease in the tariﬀ, the percentage
increase in enterprise output per worker is 2 percentagepoints higher in the district with bank
branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in the district with mean bank branches
per capita. Results suggest that in contrast to household enterprises, the capital-labor ratio of non-
household enterprises is not bank dependent. This is consistent with greater outsourcing from larger,
formal ﬁrms to non-household enterprises than to household enterprises, resulting in these larger
ﬁrms substituting for banks by providing access to funds. There is also evidence of greater likelihood
of sub-contracting to unorganized enterprises in industries facing a lower tariﬀ.T h i s ﬁnding is
consistent with evidence from case studies and micro surveys for India providing strong evidence
that such ‘sub-contracting’ from formal to unorganized enterprises has increased post liberalization
(Harris-White and Anushree Sinha, 2005 and Marjit and Maiti, 2007). Evidence for the likelihood
of such outsourcing of activity seems to be stronger for non-household enterprises. As implied by the
theoretical framework, the study ﬁnds that the likelihood of outsourcing activity to micro enterprises
is not bank dependent.
This paper makes several contributions. First, it analyzes the impact of trade liberalization
on micro enterprises, thereby adding to a literature that is not as extensive as the one on trade
liberalization eﬀects on larger formal ﬁrms (Harrison, 1994, for Côte d’Ivoire, Tybout and Westbrook,
1995, for Mexico, Pavcnik, 2002 for Chile, Fernandes, 2003, for Colombia). Second, to our knowledge,
it is the ﬁrst study to look empirically at complementarities between trade liberalization eﬀects on
domestic ﬁrms and bank presence Since the results are consistent with better access to credit facilities
leading to diﬀerential trade liberalization eﬀects on enterprise outcomes, the study contributes to
the literature on the impact of access to credit on small enterprises5 Also, given that a greater
number of bank branches per capita may be associated with more local economic activity, the study
ﬁnds evidence that micro enterprises located in dynamic areas are diﬀerentially aﬀected by trade
liberalization. This has bearing on the literature on agglomeration economies and ﬁrm performance
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).
Third the analysis looks for empirical support for the idea that trade liberalization is associated
with greater outsourcing of production activity to micro enterprises, as proposed in case studies
and micro surveys (Harris-White and Anushree Sinha, 2007, Marjit and Maiti, 2005, Maiti, 2008
for India). The study ﬁnds greater likelihood of outsourcing to micro enterprises in more open
industries. This study hence ties into the literature analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on
the size of the informal sector (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003 for Brazil and Columbia). Also, greater
local outsourcing indicates potential gains from trade liberalization for micro enterprises occurring
through linkages with larger formal domestic ﬁrms. This is an extension of the literature on the
beneﬁts of increased foreign ﬁrm presence in an open economy leading to productivity gains to
domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs. (Smarzynska, 2004, for Lithuania, Blalock and Gertler,
2008, for Indonesia and Lin, Liu and Zhang, 2009, for China provide evidence for technology spillovers
5Akoten, Sawada and Otsuka, 2006 for Kenya and Aryeetey et al, 1994 for Ghana analyze the impact of access to
credit on enterprise performance using enterprise data on sources to loans taken.
4from multinationals to domestic suppliers.) Finally, by drawing attention to complementarities
between trade liberalization, bank presence, local economic dynamism and the role played by labor
regulations in interactions between the formal and informal sectors of the economy, this study has
wideranging implications for development policy.
2 Trade liberalization and the unorganized enterprise
2.1 Trade liberalization and output
This paper estimates the impact of trade liberalization measured by a fall in tariﬀs on enterpriselevel
outcome variables and how this impact is diﬀerent for enterprises in districts with a larger number of
bank branches per capita. For this purpose, the framework provided by Rodrik (1988) and Devarajan
and Rodrik (2002) who analyze the impact of trade liberalization on R&D investments by ﬁrms, is
adopted to interpret the empirical results. It is assumed here that an unorganized enterprise produces
ad i ﬀerentiated good and faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product. In addition to
diﬀerences in quality and product attributes, product diﬀerentiation might have a spatial dimension,
especially in developing countries, where transportation costs are high. It is posited that demand for
its product is a derived demand composed of consumer demand for the product as a ﬁnal good and
demand from the organized or formal sector that outsources production processes to the unorganized
sector.
Several studies address the existence of labor costs in formal manufacturing in developing economies
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003). In the presence of labor market rigidities in the formal or organized
sector where labor laws make it costly for ﬁrms to hire and ﬁre workers, formal ﬁrms can cut costs by
outsourcing more labor intensive parts of production to the unorganized manufacturing sector and
subsequently buying these parts as inputs from unorganized enterprises. Hence, larger formal ﬁrms
may ﬁnd that the costs associated with outsourcing are oﬀset by engaging unorganized enterprises
to produce a part or entire ﬁnished item and availing of low labor costs. Under such a framework
of outsourcing to micro enterprises from the formal sector, the derived demand curve for the micro
enterprise behaves like the demand curve for the formal sector product since the product produced
by the micro enterprise is like an input into the production of the formal good. If the demand curve
for the formal sector shifts downward and is ﬂatter, the demand curve for the micro enterprise does
the same (see Hicks, 1932 for properties of the derived labor demand curve).
Import liberalization aﬀects enterprise demand in the short-run in two ways6.F i r s t ,i n c r e a s e d
competition from foreign imports results in reduced market share for the enterprise and for the
organized manufacturing ﬁrms. This is a ‘market share’ eﬀect. Second, the enterprise and the
formal ﬁrms outsourcing to the enterprise perceive a ﬂatter demand curve due to greater availability
of substitutes for their products. These two eﬀects result in a downward shift and a ﬂattening of the
demand curve for the product of formal sector ﬁrms and also the micro enterprise. Formally, the
enterprise demand curve is given by Q = A(τ, ¯ P) − D(τ, ¯ P)P where τ is the exogenous tariﬀ rate









A(τ, ¯ P),D(τ, ¯ P) > 0;Aτ > 0,D τ < 0
6This study focuses on the short-run eﬀects of trade liberalization. Hence, the number of enterprises is treated as
ﬁxed. This is reﬂected in the empirical analysis where trade liberalization is captured by a fall in the tariﬀ lagged by
one year. The motivation behind looking at short-run eﬀects is that due to data constraints at the disaggregated level
at which the analysis is performed, one can not disentangle trade eﬀects from the eﬀect of other economic factors that
change in the long run. Additionally, the empirical analysis is performed by adding controls for the total number of
enterprises in the geographical area of analysis and while ensuring that the key results of complementarity between
trade liberalization and bank presence holds.







Q]Q − c(w,B,Q) (2)
cw > 0,c B < 0,c Q > 0,c QQ > 0,c QB < 0
where c(w,B,Q) is the cost faced by the enterprise, w is the wage rate and B is bank presence,
where a higher value of B is associated with lower cost. This is because bank presence is associated
with better access to credit and a lower cost of capital It is argued in the empirical section that bank
presence is associated with better access to credi tt om i c r oe n t e r p r i s e si nI n d i ad u et oat a r g e t e d
lending policy followed by the government and the central bank. Besides, if formal sources of credit
compete with informal sources for micro enterprises, both sources can be cheaper in districts with
greater bank presence. Additionally, higher bank presence, by spurring economic activity, innovation
and dynamism in the area can generate spillover eﬀects due to agglomeration economies brought
about by channels like input and knowledge sharing.
cw and cB are partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to w and B respectively, cQ
is marginal cost for ﬁxed w and B, cQB is the partial derivative of cQ with respect to B and cQQ is
the partial derivative of cQ with respect to Q.







Q = cQ(w,B,Q) (3)
yielding,
Q∗ = Q(w,B,τ, ¯ P) (4)




B(τ,¯ P) t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u eo fb a n kp r e s e n c e ,s a yB0 such
that for B<B 0,
dQ
dτ > 0 and for B>B 0,
dQ
dτ < 0.
This proposition, for which a proof is presented in Appendix A, implies that the impact of import
liberalization on output can be diﬀerent for enterprises in districts with diﬀerent bank presence if the
marginal revenue curve before and after liberalization intersect in the ﬁrst quadrant. Proposition
1 implies that in this case, it is possible that for enterprises in districts with higher bank branches
per capita and hence lower cost, a fall in the tariﬀ is associated with greater enterprise output.
Similarly, a fall in the tariﬀ is associated with lower enterprise output for enterprises in districts
with low bank branches per capita and hence higher cost. This suggests complementarities between
trade liberalization eﬀects and bank presence in the district in which an enterprise is located.
Figure 1 shows one possible scenario where an enterprise in a district with high bank branches
per capita produces more output with a fall in tariﬀ, while an enterprise in a district with low
bank branches per capita produces less. The horizontal and vertical axes measure output and
prices respectively. Both types of enterprises face a downward-sloping demand curve AR with
corresponding marginal revenue curve MR. The low-cost enterprise faces a lower marginal cost of
production MCL compared to the highcost enterprise which faces cost MCH.T h e l o w - c o s t a n d
highcost enterprises produce output yL and yH respectively.
Trade liberalization causes a shift in the demand curve to AR0 and a corresponding shift in the
marginal revenue curve to MR0. The new demand and marginal revenue curves shift downward and
are ﬂatter. From Figure 1, post trade liberalization, the low-cost enterprise produces at y0
L,w h i c h
is higher than the level of output produced before trade liberalization and the high-cost enterprise
produces y0
H which is lower than the output before trade liberalization. Hence, in this scenario,
trade liberalization is associated with higher output in the low-cost enterprise and lower output
in the high-cost enterprise. Lower costs result in unorganized enterprises producing larger outputs
6and charging a lower price for their products. Rodrik (1988) and Devarajan and Rodrik (2002)
call this the ‘pro-competitive’ eﬀect of trade liberalization. Lower costs enable micro enterprises
to take advantage of increased sub-contracting to the formal sector, as low-cost formal ﬁrms also
respond by selling more at a lower price. The above analysis implies that theoretically, the impact
of trade liberalization on enterprise output depends on the shift in the demand curve due to trade
liberalization and on enterprise cost. If cost is high, trade liberalization is associated with lower
enterprise output. Also, with a large downward shift (and ﬂattening) in the demand curve, trade
liberalization is associated with lower enterprise output.
The discussion now turns to the complementarity eﬀect between the trade liberalization eﬀect




This proposition, proved in Appendix A, states that the positive eﬀect of trade liberalization on
output is augmented and the negative eﬀect mitigated with higher bank presence.
2.2 Trade liberalization, factor intensity and labor productivity
Micro enterprises or informal manufacturing enterprises are competitive mainly because they face
low labor costs. However, as these enterprises produce larger amounts of output, labor becomes
costly to use relative to capital. This is due to a variety of reasons. As an enterprise increases its
labor input, it approaches the threshold after which it falls under the purview of labor regulation.
For instance, in the Indian case, if the enterprise uses more than ten workers, it is required to pay
ﬁxed costs of registration under the Central Factories Act. It subsequently faces higher labor costs
in order to adhere to labor laws. Also, in the Indian case, seven workers are allowed by law to form
a union. As an unorganized enterprise hiring outside labor employs more workers, it faces the threat
of its workers forming a union and demanding greater beneﬁts. Besides, household enterprises rarely
operate in separate premises and base their operations at home. Enterprises hiring workers also face
physical space constraints and as the enterprise crams more workers into a small space, it gains less
output for additional labor used
This implies that larger enterprises might prefer to substitute capital for labor. Hence, higher
enterprise outputs would be associated with higher capital-labor ratios. Combined with the results
for enterprise output, this means that a fall in the tariﬀ is associated with higher capital-labor ratios
for enterprises in districts with higher bank presence that face a lower cost of capital and with
lower capital-labor ratios for enterprises with low bank presence that face a higher cost of capital.
Additionally, the complementarity eﬀect would imply that the positive eﬀect of trade liberalization on
the enterprise capital-labor ratio will be augmented and the negative eﬀect mitigated for enterprises
in districts with greater bank presence.
Next, the analysis considers the impact of trade liberalization on labor productivity by analyzing
the impact of a fall in tariﬀs on output per worker and value added per worker in enterprises located
in districts with diﬀerential bank branches per capita. Labor productivity is treated as a function
of the capital-labor ratio employed by the enterprise and an enterprisespeciﬁc technology parameter
representing vintage of technology or labor eﬃciency due to learning by doing or skill. If enterprises
in districts with a greater number of bank branches per capita use higher capital-labor ratios due
to trade liberalization, this will correspond to higher labor productivity. Hence, it is hypothesized
that trade liberalization eﬀects on labor productivity will mirror eﬀects on the capital-labor ratio.
Also, higher bank presence is also associated with agglomeration economies, which can have positive
eﬀects on enterprise labor productivity and capital-intensity.
This theoretical set up implies that with trade liberalization, low-cost formal ﬁrms expand their
output due to the ‘pro-competitive’ eﬀect. This would result in greater outsourcing to micro en-
terprises since these low-cost formal ﬁrms have a greater incentive to cut down on labor costs and
incur the cost of sub-contracting production activity as opposed to highcost, small formal ﬁrms
who may ﬁnd that outsourcing costs outweigh the beneﬁts from lower labor costs. The hypothesis
7that trade liberalization is associated with a greater likelihood of outsourcing to micro enterprises
is therefore also examined, to investigate if this eﬀect diﬀers with diﬀering bank presence with the
prior assumption that it does not.
In summary, it is expected that trade liberalization is associated with higher enterprise output,
capital-labor ratio and labor productivity in enterprises located in districts with high bank branches
per capita and with lower enterprise output, capital-labor ratio and labor productivity in enterprises
located in districts with low bank branches per capita. Additionally, it is expected that the positive
eﬀect of trade liberalization on enterprise outcomes is augmented and the negative eﬀects mitigated
in enterprises in districts with high bank branches per capita. This is the complementarity eﬀect.
Further, greater likelihood of outsourcing to micro enterprises is expected with trade liberalization
though this eﬀect is not expected to be bank dependent, given that outsourcing activity is not. In this
framework, it is noted that trade liberalization aﬀects enterprise outcomes like productivity through
an alternate channel — through better ﬁnancial inclusion — in addition to through reallocation of
resources among heterogeneous ﬁrms much emphasized in the literature spawned by Melitz (2003).
To estimate empirically these trade liberalization eﬀects, a linear model is estimated on survey data,
with the outcome variable of interest modeled as a function of districtlevel bank branches per capita,
tariﬀs faced by the enterprise and an interaction of bank branches per capita and the tariﬀ.F o r
the analysis of outsourcing, a dummy variable is employed that equals 1 if the enterprise sells or
is on contract to sell all or most of its output to another enterprise. Finally, this study focuses on
the direct eﬀect of trade liberalization on enterprise outcome variables and the diﬀerential eﬀect of
trade liberalization across enterprises located in districts with diﬀering bank presence.
3 Empirical estimation
3.1 Basic speciﬁcation
The impact of trade liberalization and access to credit on micro enterprises in India is estimated
using the following speciﬁcation
Ln(Z)isdj,t = α + β1Bankssdt + β2 Tariffj,t−1 + β3Bankssdt∗Tariffj,t−1 + γst + ηjt + εisdjt
(5)
The index ‘i’ represents the enterprise, ‘j’ represents the industry, ‘s’ represents the state and
sector (rural or urban) and ‘d’ represents the district in which the enterprise is located, while ‘t’
represents time7. Z is the outcome variable of interest. It can be output, capital-labor ratio, capital
use or labor productivity. ‘Banks’ is the number of bank branches per capita in the sector (rural
or urban) of district ‘d’i ns t a t e‘ s’a tt i m e‘ t’. ‘Tariﬀ ”i st h et a r i ﬀ prevailing in 3digit industry
‘j’ lagged one year. γst are state by sector (rural or urban) bytime ﬁxed eﬀects and ηjt are 2digit
industry bytime ﬁxed eﬀects. Note that the tariﬀ variable varies across time and 3digit industries
while the industry bytime ﬁxed eﬀects are at the 2digit industry level. This allows one to estimate
β2 using variation across 3digit industries within a 2digit industry. εisdjt is the idiosyncratic error
term. As discussed earlier, the expectation is that the key coeﬃcient of interest, β3<0 due to the
complementarity eﬀect. This implies that in districts with higher bank branches per capita, a fall
in tariﬀs will be associated with higher enterprise output, capital-labor ratio and labor productivity
7All the regressions also control for the formal sector wage and rental rate of capital for the 2digit industry, state
in which the enterprise is located and the relevant year. Household enterprises do not pay a wage since they only
employ household workers. However, in this case, it is argued that the formal wage captures labor’s opportunity
cost. Controlling for the rental rate of capital in the 2digit industry, state for the given year, higher bank branches
per capita in a district are associated with better access to credit and hence a lower cost of capital in that district
within the state. One concern is that trade liberalization may aﬀect the formal sector wage and rental rate due to
Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects where trade liberalization results in India specializing in more laborintensive sectors where
it has a comparative advantage, driving up the wage-rental ratio. Hence, these regressions are also estimated without
the formal sector wage and rental rate of capital. Results are qualitatively unchanged.
8vis-à-vis districts with low bank branches per capita. β2 is the eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the outcome
variable when bank branches per capita are zero. Here, since the dataset is not a panel, one cannot
control for ﬁrm entry and exit. This means that one cannot comment on any changes in individual
ﬁrm behavior over time.
This empirical speciﬁcation allows one to address the endogeneity problem arising in the esti-
mation of the impact of trade liberalization on the capital-labor ratio of the enterprise from policy
makers protecting the more labor intensive industries. Developing countries like India may protect
their labor intensive industries more than capitalintensive ones (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004 con-
clude that the most heavily protected sectors in many developing countries tend to employ a high
proportion of unskilled workers earning low wages). This implies that tariﬀs might be correlated
with shocks to industry level capital-labor ratios. The estimation controls for these types of shocks
to the greatest possible extent through the industry bytime eﬀects. Hence, only tariﬀ variation
across 3digit industries within a 2digit industry is exploited to identify trade liberalization eﬀects.
The speciﬁcation also includes a set of state by rural/urban bytime ﬁxed eﬀects. These eﬀects
control for timevarying unobservable statespeciﬁc characteristics, policies and other shocks that
aﬀect bank presence and enterprise outcomes simultaneously. This is important because there is
wide variation in labor policy and institutions across Indian states (Besley and Burgess, 2004). In all
the estimation equations, enterpriselevel multipliers are used, which are the inverse of the probability
that the enterprise is sampled, to weight observations and arrive at population estimates. Standard
errors are clustered at the village or town level in rural and urban areas respectively. The variable
bank branches per capita in the district captures lower cost for micro enterprises located in that
district since higher values of this variable are associated with better access to credit and hence a
lower cost of capital and also with greater economic activity, growth prospects and dynamism in the
area that engender spillovers through agglomeration economies.
It is argued that banks per capita at the district level can be useful in explaining better access to
credit to unorganized manufacturing enterprises for policy reasons. Prior to the nationalization of
the banking industry in India in 1969, the poorest sections of the society relied heavily on informal
sources of credit. They were excluded from the formal credit market due to inability to produce
collateral for loans. To correct moral hazard issues and to eﬀect redistribution, the central bank
introduced ‘priority sector lending’ in 1969 (see Shajahan, 1998 for more on prioritysector lending
in India). Under this policy, a certain percentage of net bank credit was to go to ‘priority sectors’.
‘Priority sectors’ consisted of sectors like agriculture, smallscale industries, road and water transport
operators, retail traders, small businesses, village artisans, professionals and self-employed persons.
This directedlending program to the priority sector is supportive of banks per capita at the district
level being a valid proxy for cheaper and greater access to credit for micro enterprises. The analysis
checks that bank branches per capita are positively correlated with total credit outstanding in a
district per capita at the district level for the year 2000. The correlation is 0.6 for the urban sector
and 0.5 for the rural sector. In addition, more competition among bank branches in a district can
lead to lower transaction costs associated with obtaining loans, for instance, through lower bribes
demanded by bank oﬃcials. In addition, it is argued that a greater bank presence in districts
aﬀects credit availability from informal lenders positively to the extent that informal lenders see
local bank branches as competition. When informal lenders are in competition with banks, greater
bank presence and better access to institutional credit will result in lower interest rates for informal
loans.
These arguments are supported by Burgess and Pande (2005) who study the impact of banking on
rural poverty. Though they do not look directly at the impact of banking on unorganized enterprises,
their study looks at the impact of rural bank expansion on rural non-agricultural output. The authors
ﬁnd that an increase in the number of banked locations in a state increased total output of the state
and that this increase was accounted for by increases in non-agricultural output. They contend that
their study is consistent with other previous studies using districtlevel data that ﬁnd rural bank
branch expansion increased non-agricultural growth. The authors ﬁnd that it was the informal or
9unregistered manufacturing and service sectors that mainly beneﬁted from rural bank expansion,
which is consistent with the result here that greater bank branches per capita at the district level
corresponds to higher enterprise outputs. A large number of measures are used in the literature to
capture access to credit. However, at the district level within each state, the analysis is constrained
by data availability of several alternate measures. More importantly, it is argued that for India,
bank branches per capita is by far the best measure relatively free of endogeneity concerns related
to unobserved districtlevel factors driving both credit availability and enterprise outcomes, since
it was largely driven by government policy targeted towards improving credit access to backward
regions.
3.2 Credit Channel: Estimation with controls
Next, the analysis attempts to isolate the credit channel through which greater bank presence in-
teracts with trade liberalization to aﬀect enterprise outcomes. As argued previously, higher bank
branches per capita can lower enterprise costs through better access to credit resulting in a lower cost
of capital. Additionally, greater bank presence may be associated with greater economic activity in a
district or better economic prospects which might lower enterprise costs by generating agglomeration
economies. To get at the complementarities between trade liberalization eﬀects and better access
to credit for enterprises which lowers their cost of capital, equation (3.1) is estimated, with control
variables in addition to bank branches per capita. The following equation is then estimated:
Ln(Z)isdj,t = α + β1Bankssdt+β2DistrictControlssdt+β3Tariffj,t−1+β4Bankssdt (6)
∗Tariffj,t−1+β5DistrictControlssdt∗Tariffj,t−1+γst+ηjt + εisdjt
The control variables are the total unorganized sector output per capita and growth in unorga-
nized sector output in the district in which the enterprise is located8. The expectation is that these
unorganized sector activity variables are correlated with formal sector activity (activity in organized
manufacturing) at the district level. Hence, it is argued that these variables proxy for the level and
growth of economic activity in the district and hence control for economic dynamism of or better
future economic prospects in the district. Since these variables are at the district level and are a
sum of outputs of a large number of micro enterprises operating in all industries in the district,
it is contended that these controls are uncorrelated with the outcome variables, which are at the
micro enterprise level. β4<0 would imply complementarities between trade liberalization eﬀects and
greater bank presence through the credit channel, where greater bank presence lowers enterprise
costs by lowering the cost of capital.
4D a t a
The data used for this study come from ﬁve diﬀerent sources. A detailed description of the variables
is presented in the Data Appendix. The enterpriselevel data come from the nationallevel Survey of
Unorganized Manufacturing and Repairing Enterprises by the National Sample Survey Organization,
India. The data cover unorganized manufacturing and repairing enterprises which are broadly deﬁned
as enterprises employing fewer than ten workers if using power and fewer than twenty workers if
not using power. These enterprises are not required to register under the Factories Act 1948 (see
various reports by the NSSO on Unorganized Manufacturing Sector in India for a detailed deﬁnition
of enterprises covered under the survey). The terms “unorganized manufacturing sector”, “informal
manufacturing sector” and “unregistered manufacturing sector” are often used interchangeably in
8The total number of unregistered enterprises and growth in unregistered enterprises in the district in which the
enterprise is located are also tested as controls while ensuring that the key result holds. These results are available
upon request.
10India. Three rounds of repeated cross-section data are used, for the years 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-
01.The data cover all Indian states and Union Territories except two states, Assam and Jammu and
Kashmir and include 390 Indian districts. The analysis is restricted to manufacturing enterprises
only.
Unorganized sector enterprises produce a large variety of products including ﬂour milling, slaugh-
tering, sun drying ﬁsh, wooden furniture and baskets, lace, embroidery, rope, medicated water and
lowend medicines, tooth powder, agricultural metal tools, metal utensils, batteries, valves, cables,
bulbs and electric fans. Unorganized manufacturing enterprises in India are classiﬁed into household
enterprises that do not hire workers (called Own Account Manufacturing Enterprises or OAMEs), en-
terprises hiring fewer than six workers including household and hired workers (called Non-Directory
Manufacturing Enterprisesor NDMEs) and enterprises hiring more than six workers including house-
hold and hired workers (called Directory Manufacturing Enterprises or DMEs). DMEs were not
surveyed in the 1989-90 data round.
Indian output tariﬀ data at the commodity level are used. These are aggregated using a simple
average to the NIC 1998 3digit industry level9. The data on the number of rural and urban bank
branches in each district for the years 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-01 are obtained from Basic Sta-
tistical Returns data published by the Reserve Bank of India. The number of bank branches are
normalized by the total district population. The sample has a total of 390 districts across twenty-six
Indian states and India’s Union Territories for each year, providing rich variation in the number of
bank branches per capita across India. Linking the NSS enterprise data and bank data from the
Reserve Bank of India poses a diﬃculty. The Reserve Bank deﬁnes a village as rural if its population
is less than 10,000. The Indian Census however, deﬁnes a village as rural if its population is less than
5,000. Hence, villages with populations between 5,000 and 10,000 would be classiﬁed as urban in
the Indian census, but as rural in the bank data. This creates a discrepancy between the numerator
and the denominator in the banks per capita variable. To address this, it is argued that only a
small percentage of Indian villages have a population size of between 5,000 and 10,000. Based on
1991 population census data, Singh, Chakraborty and Roy (see Table 2, page 18) indicate that at
27 percent, Tamil Nadu state had the highest percentage of villages with a population of more than
2,500. Since this percentage will be lower for villages with a population of greater than 5,000, it is
argued that this discrepancy is not likely to bias the estimates severely 10.
Moreover, as a robustness check, d the rural and urban branches in a district are added and
divided by the total population in a district to construct an overall districtlevel bank measure. The
regressions are rerun using this as the bank measure. Variation is lost in the bank variable between
rural and urban areas within a district. The results are qualitatively unchanged. Table 1 (a) and
(b) present summary statistics for key variables. From Table 1 (a), the average tariﬀ fell from 147.2
percent in 1988 to 43.5 percent in 1999. Mean number of bank branches per capita increased from
0.00008 in 1989 to 0.00010 in 2000. Table 1 (b) shows estimated means for the population for both
household and non-household ﬁrms. Non-household ﬁrms are larger — they employ more workers
and have larger capital stocks. The value of output per worker is higher in non-household enterprises
than household enterprises. A discussion of the results is presented in the following sections, with
a focus on the impact of trade liberalization on the outcome variables and on how these trade
liberalization eﬀects diﬀer across districts with diﬀerential bank presence.
9A description of the tariﬀ data can be found in Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy, 2007.
10In addition, a village can be classiﬁed as urban in the Indian Population Census only if, along with having a
population of more than 5,000 it satisﬁes the following two conditions: 1) at least seventy-ﬁve percent of the male
working population is engaged in a non-agricultural activity and 2) the density of population is more than four hundred
per square kilometer. This places further restrictions on a village with a population between 5,000 and 10,000 being
classiﬁed as urban in the population census.
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5.1 Trade liberalization, bank presence and enterprise outcomes for house-
hold enterprises
Since DMEs (enterprises hiring between six and ten workers) are not sampled in the 1989-90 round
of the data, the analysis is conducted by pooling all three years of data (1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-
01) for the OAMEs or household enterprises (indicated by HH for household) and the years 1994-95
and 2000-01 for the NDMEs and DMEs which are non-household enterprises hiring outside workers
(indicated by NHH for non-household). The impact of trade liberalization is evaluated, measured by
ar e d u c t i o ni nt a r i ﬀs on enterprise outcomes and by how the trade liberalization eﬀect diﬀers across
districts with diﬀerential bank branches per capita. Table 2 (a) presents results for estimation equa-
tion (3.1) for all the outcome variables of interest for household enterprises, enterprises employing
only household workers.
As expected, the interaction term between bank branches per capita and lagged tariﬀ capturing
the complementarity eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant for all enterprise outcomes. This means that
in districts with higher bank branches per capita, trade liberalization is associated with higher
enterprise outputs, capital use, capital-labor ratio and labor productivity. Table 2 (b) presents the
marginal eﬀect of the tariﬀ on enterprise outcomes in districts with bank branches per capita at the
minimum, mean, seventy-ﬁfth percentile and maximum. A reduction in tariﬀs is associated with a
decrease in enterprise output in the district with mean bank branches per capita. On the contrary,
in the district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile, a decrease in tariﬀsi s
associated with an increase in enterprise output11 Also, a 10 percentagepoint decrease in the tariﬀ is
associated with a 0.4 percent decrease in enterprise output in the district with mean bank branches
per capita and a 1 percent increase in enterprise output in the district with bank branches per
capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. This suggests that household enterprise outputs are higher
with trade liberalization in districts with higher bank branches per capita as enterprises are able to
avail of lower costs.
Also, from the table, a decrease in the tariﬀ corresponds to a decrease in the capital-labor ratio in
the district with mean bank branches per capita and to an increase in the capital-labor ratio in the
district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. A 10 percentagepoint decrease
in the tariﬀ is associated with a 0.6 percent decrease in enterprise capital-labor ratio in the district
with mean bank branches per capita and a 2 percent increase in enterprise capital-labor ratio in the
district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. Given that results indicate
that trade liberalization is associated with higher capital-labor ratios in districts with high bank
branches per capita, labor productivity is expected to be higher with trade liberalization in districts
with high bank presence. A decrease in tariﬀ is found to correspond to a decrease in output per
worker in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district with bank branches
per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. However, for a 10 percentagepoint decrease in tariﬀs, the
percentage decrease in enterprise output per worker is 2 percentage points lower in the district with
bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in the district with mean bank branches
per capita.
5.2 Trade liberalization, bank presence and enterprise outcomes for non-
household enterprises
Tables 3 (a) and (b) present the same results for non-household enterprises. The interaction terms
between bank branches per capita and lagged tariﬀs are negative and signiﬁcant for output and
11Trade liberalization is always observed to be associated with large eﬀects in districts with the maximum number
of bank branches per capita. However, this value of bank branches per capita only applies to very few districts at the
extreme tail of the distribution of districts by bank branches per capita.
12output per worker, providing evidence for the complementarity eﬀect, though for output, the com-
plementarity eﬀect is signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level. Table 3 (b) shows marginal eﬀects of
the tariﬀ on the outcome variables. For output, a fall in the tariﬀ is associated with an increase in
enterprise output in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district with bank
branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. Further, for a 10 percentagepoint decrease in tar-
iﬀs, the percentage increase in enterprise output is 2 percentage points greater in the district with
bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in districts with zero bank branches
per capita. Turning to labor productivity, a decrease in the tariﬀ is associated with an increase in
output per worker in the district with mean bank branches per capita and in the district with bank
branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile. Also, for a 10 percentagepoint decrease in the
tariﬀ, the percentage increase in enterprise output per worker is 2 percentage points higher in the
district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile than in the district with mean
bank branches per capita.
Turning to capital use and the capital-labor ratio, from Table 3(b) a decrease in the tariﬀ
corresponds to a decrease in the capital-labor ratio and capital in the district with mean bank
branches per capita and in the district with bank branches per capita in the seventy-ﬁfth percentile.
From Table 3(a), the negative interaction coeﬃcients between the tariﬀ and bank branches per
capita measuring complementarity between bank presence and trade liberalization, though negative,
are not signiﬁcant. This suggests that capital use and the capital-labor ratio for non-household
enterprises are not bank dependent. This is consistent with a scenario of outsourcing to non-
household enterprises from larger, formal ﬁrms being accompanied by provision of funds. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that outsourcing is more prevalent for non-household enterprises than household
enterprises (see Harris-White and Sinha, 2007, page 99). This is reinforced by the data which
indicates that the percentage of enterprises reporting selling or being on contract to sell to another
enterprise is larger for non-household enterprises than for household enterprises. In addition, the
empirical analysis on the impact of trade liberalization on outsourcing suggests that openness is
associated with a greater likelihood of outsourcing for non-household than household enterprises.
If outsourcing is more prevalent for non-household enterprises and is associated with transfer of
funds, one would expect capital use and capital-labor ratios to be more bank dependent in the case
of household enterprises than in the case of non-household enterprises. This is in line with the
previous ﬁnding that for household enterprises, capital use and the capital-labor ratio are indeed
bank dependent, in contrast to the ﬁnding for non-household enterprises.
Additionally, from Table 3(b), for non-household enterprises, in contrast to household enterprises,
a percentagepoint decrease in tariﬀs is associated with an increase in output and labor productivity
measured by output per worker even in districts with the minimum value of bank branches per capita.
This too is consistent with greater outsourcing to these enterprises with trade liberalization and with
such outsourcing being associated with technology transfer from parent enterprises. Examination
of the data on unorganized enterprises for the year 2000 reveals that eighty-eight percent of non-
household enterprises and ninety-seven percent of household enterprises on a contract to sell most of
their output to another enterprise also received raw materials from the buyer enterprise. Hence, the
data suggest that sub-contracting is accompanied by the provision of raw materials for production.
This is consistent with micro surveys (Marjit and Maiti, 2005 for India, Wiboonchutikula, 2001 for
Thailand) that observe that raw materials are often supplied by larger factories sub-contracting to
these units (in the case of units tied to larger factories). This is a type of technology transfer from
parent enterprises when they sub-contract to micro enterprises — they transfer superior technology
embodied in material inputs.
135.3 Trade Liberalization, Bank Presence and Enterprise outcomes: Esti-
mation with Controls
Next, an attempt is made to isolate the credit channel through which a higher bank presence
aﬀects enterprise costs. This is done by estimating equation (3.2) where control variables and their
interaction with the tariﬀ are included on the right hand side. The control variables are measures of
economic activity at the district level. Total unorganized sector output across all industries at the
district level per capita and the growth in total unorganized sector output at the district level are
used. If the tariﬀ and bank interaction eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant with these additional controls,
it is argued that evidence is consistent with greater bank presence in a district being associated with
a lower cost of capital for enterprises through better access to credit, thereby leading to diﬀerential
eﬀects of trade liberalization.
It is also veriﬁed that the district-level control variables if measured instead at the state level, are
correlated with GDP at the state level and are hence good proxies for economic activity and growth
prospects. The correlation between total output in the unorganized sector and GDP at the state
level is 0.8. The correlation between growth in unorganized sector output and GDP growth at the
state level is -0.4, suggesting that future growth prospects in a state are associated with negative
growth in the unorganized sector.
Table 4 presents results for the estimation of equation (3.2) for household enterprises. The control
variables are unorganized sector output per capita and growth in unorganized sector output at the
district level. Table 5 presents corresponding results for non-household enterprises. Focusing on the
interaction terms between the tariﬀ and banks per capita from Table 4, for all enterprise outcomes,
the coeﬃcients are still negative and signiﬁcant. From Table 5, the coeﬃcients on the interaction
mirror the regression without controls in sign and signiﬁcance for capital, the capital-labor ratio
and labor productivity. For output, the interaction term loses signiﬁcance. Overall, results indicate
signiﬁcant complementarity between trade liberalization eﬀects and higher bank presence even in
the presence of controls for economic activity.
Turning to the control variables, the coeﬃcients from both tables suggest that trade liberalization
is associated with lower enterprise outcomes in districts with greater economic activity and prospects
(note that the correlation between growth in unregistered output and growth in GDP at the state
level that captures future economic prospects is negative) hinting at negative externalities from
agglomeration. Greater economic activity can be associated with intense competition for inputs
like labor and power and for infrastructure facilities. This can lead to a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm
performance due to the competition eﬀect dominating any gains due to agglomeration economies.
Largely, results in this section provide evidence consistent with the story of trade liberalization
resulting in diﬀerential eﬀects in districts with higher bank branches per capita through the credit
channel. Micro enterprises with better access to credit can face lower costs and expand output,
employ higher capital-labor ratios and have higher labor productivity with trade liberalization.
5.4 Outsourcing
To investigate if lower tariﬀs are associated with a greater likelihood of outsourcing to unorganized
enterprises and if these eﬀects diﬀer for enterprises in districts with diﬀerential bank presence, the
following equation is estimated in the cross-section for the year 2000:
Outsourcing Dummyisdj = α + β 1Bankssd + β2 Tariffj,1999+ β3Bankssdt (7)
∗Tariffj,1999 + γs + ηj + εisdj
As with speciﬁcation (3.1), the index ‘i’ represents the enterprise, ‘j’ represents the industry,
‘s’ represents the state and sector (rural or urban) and ‘d’ represents the district in which the
enterprise is located. ‘Outsourcing Dummy’ is equal to 1 if the unorganized enterprise sells its
output to another enterprise or a contractor or is on contract to sell most of its output to another
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tell from the data if the enterprise is selling to another enterprise in the organized or unorganized
sector. If the enterprise is selling to a contractor or is on contract to sell to another enterprise, it
is unlikely that the buyer is another unorganized enterprise. First, contractors and middlemen are
employed by larger ﬁrms in the organized sector to co-ordinate sub-contracting to the unorganized
sector. Second, contract enforcement in India is weak and costly and in addition, most unorganized
enterprises are unregistered and have minimal access to the legal system.
‘Banks’ is the number of bank branches per capita in the sector (rural or urban) of district ‘d’
in state ‘s’ in the year 2000. ‘Tariﬀ ”i st h et a r i ﬀ prevailing in 3digit industry ‘j’ lagged one year
for 1999. γs are state by sector (rural or urban) ﬁxed eﬀects and ηj are 2digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
εisdjt is the idiosyncratic error term. Note that the tariﬀ variable varies at the 3digit industry level
and that the speciﬁcation includes 2digit industry dummies. The 2digit industry dummies control
for industryspeciﬁcs h o c k st h a ta ﬀect tariﬀs and outsourcing simultaneously. The identiﬁcation of
trade liberalization eﬀects is from the variation in tariﬀs across 3digit industries within a 2digit
industry. β3<0 will imply that enterprises in 3digit industries within a 2digit industry with a lower
tariﬀ are more likely to sell or be on contract to sell to other enterprises in districts with more bank
branches per capita. Hence, it measures the complementarity eﬀect between trade liberalization and
bank presence. β2 is the eﬀect of the tariﬀ when bank branches per capita are zero.
Table 6 (a) reports estimation results under a linear probability model for household and non-
household enterprises12 Table 6 (b) shows the marginal eﬀects of the tariﬀ in districts with bank
branches per capita at the minimum, mean, seventy-ﬁfth percentile and maximum. At the average
value of bank branches per capita, lower industry tariﬀ is associated with a higher probability of
selling to another enterprise or contractor or being on a contract to sell to another enterprise. For a
10 percentage point lower tariﬀ, the probability of selling to or being on contract to sell to another
enterprise is higher by 6 percent for household and 7 percent for non-household enterprises. Thus,
results indicate that likelihood of outsourcing is higher for non-household than household enterprises.
As hypothesized, the interaction term between bank branches per capita and the tariﬀ is negative
but not signiﬁcant, indicating that outsourcing activity is not bank dependent. This is sensible given
that outsourcing of production activity is done by larger ﬁrms that have access to alternate sources
of credit like equity and debt markets13.
Table 7 estimates the same regressions as in Table 6 (a), however, the control variables of total
output per capita in the unorganized sector and growth in total unorganized sector output in the
district, are added. The coeﬃcient on the lagged tariﬀ variable is stable in sign and magnitude.
None of the interaction terms is signiﬁcant as before. Since the results are only for the year 2000
and one cannot look at tariﬀ changes for a 3digit industry over time, the results only indicate a
higher probability of outsourcing in 3digit industries with a lower tariﬀ after controlling for 2digit
industry shocks that aﬀect tariﬀs and outsourcing at the same time. However, if these cross-section
results can be generalized over time, they would mean that trade liberalization is associated with a
greater likelihood of outsourcing to unorganized enterprises.
The ﬁnding in this paper of a higher likelihood of outsourcing in industries faced with a lower
tariﬀ in districts with higher bank presence is consistent with the literature on the role of linkages
between small enterprises and larger ﬁrms in competing in a global environment. The literature
acknowledges linkages between small enterprises and larger ﬁrms where small enterprises provide
intermediate inputs and sub-contract to larger registered ﬁrms. Small enterprise sub-contractors,
unburdened by labor and other regulations pertaining to the formal registered manufacturing sector,
provide ﬂexibility to larger exporting ﬁrms to adjust size to negative global demand shocks and enable
import competing ﬁrms to cut costs and compete globally.
12Probit estimation results are not qualitatively diﬀerent.
13In fact, for the year 1994, only about 5 percent of credit accounts with commercial banks belonged to public and
private sector companies, while ninety percent belonged to individuals and proprietary and partnership concerns and
family undertakings.
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This paper estimates the impact of trade liberalization on output, labor and capital use, capital-labor
ratio and labor productivity of enterprises in the unorganized sector in India and the diﬀerential
eﬀects of trade liberalization on these enterprise outcomes for enterprises in districts with diﬀeren-
tial bank presence. Using a national dataset of household enterprises and enterprises hiring outside
workers for 1989, 1994 and 2000, the ﬁnding is that trade liberalization is associated with higher
output, capital-labor ratios and labor productivity for household enterprises and non-household en-
terprises hiring outside workers where bank presence is higher. Results suggest that micro enterprises
in districts with a greater bank presence can take advantage of lower costs to expand output due
to a ﬂatter demand curve resulting from increased substitutes due to trade liberalization and also
capitalize on increased demand from the formal sector that sub-contracts activities to the informal
sector. Enterprises in districts with more banks are also able to substitute capital for labor since
expanding by using more labor is not strategic for these enterprises that are largely competitive
due to their ability to avoid compliance to labor laws. The research also ﬁnds some evidence for
greater likelihood of outsourcing in more open industries, providing suggestive evidence that large
ﬁrms expand by sub-contracting tasks to the unorganized sector to bypass labor regulation.
These results have several implications for policy. First, the ﬁndings in this paper lend some
support to the argument made by Harriss-White and Sinha (2007) that formal ﬁrms may sub-
contract labor intensive tasks to the unorganized sector where labor regulations are less enforced to
become more competitive. It casts some doubt on the eﬃcacy of labor laws put in place for worker
protection. Onerous labor regulation can defeat its purpose by leading to greater activity in the
informal or unregistered sector where work conditions may be poor. Second, from a povertyreduction
perspective, it is important to consider the impact of trade reform on unorganized manufacturing,
given that it employs the poor in developing economies. The results from this paper indicate that the
impact of trade liberalization on these enterprises is diﬀerent for enterprises located in districts with
a larger number of bank branches per capita and hence face lower costs. Third, many developing
countries, including India, have instituted policies to provide credit, infrastructure and technology
to small and micro enterprises at concessional rates due to the argument that these enterprises are
under a credit crunch and that improving access to credit can help enterprises upgrade technology
and improve productivity and technical eﬃciency in this sector, enabling them to be competitive
in a global economy (Harris-White and Sinha, 2007, Majumder, 2004 and Raj, 2007 for India,
Admassie and Matambalya, 2002 for Tanzania). This study provides evidence that access to credit
can be a determinant of how trade liberalization aﬀects enterprise size, capital-labor ratio and labor
productivity of micro enterprises in India.
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Table 1(a):  Manufacturing Tariffs and Bank Branches Per Capita by Year 
 
  1989  1994  2000 
Minimum Lagged Tariff (percentage)  90.0  56.7  31.1 
Mean Lagged Tariff (percentage)  147.2  84.4  43.5 
Maximum Lagged Tariff (percentage)  288.4  150.6  85.3 
Minimum number of Bank Branches 
per Capita 
0  0  0 
Mean number of Bank Branches per 
Capita 
0.0000826  0.0000815  0.000099 
Maximum number of Bank Branches 
per Capita 
0.0011399  0.0021352  0.0021761 
       
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Manila, Reserve Bank of India and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 1(b): Mean of Enterprise Outcome Variables for Household and Non Household 
Enterprises by Year 
 
  Household Enterprises 
(HH) 
Non Household Enterprises 
(NHH) 
  1994  2000  1994  2000 
Output (1993 rupees)  19,314.93  22,193.57  228,545.30  347,897.00 
Capital (1993 rupees)  12,489.29  16,348.43  145,696.60  173,794.70 
Labor (number)  1.97  1.71  4.93  4.68 
Capital-Labor  Ratio  (1993  rupees 
per worker) 
7,629.03  10,929.95  30,269.81  37,390.30 
Output per Worker (1993 rupees 
per worker) 
10,616.18  13,118.32  41,185.19  59,600.92 
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20Table 1(c): Correlations between key district level variables 
 
  B  UO  GO  B*T  UO*T  GO*T 
Bank Branches per Capita (B)    0.12  0.06       
Unregistered Output per Capita (UO)      0.20       
Growth Unregistered Output (GO)             
B*Lagged Tariff (T)          0.09  -0.05 
UO*Lagged Tariff (T)            0.07 
GO*Lagged Tariff (T)             
 




Table 2 (a):Trade Liberalization, Banks and Enterprise Outcomes for Household 
Enterprises 
 
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 
Ln(W) formal  -0.124  0.018  -0.037  -0.068 
  (0.081)  (0.12)  (0.125)  (0.080) 
Ln(R) formal  -0.007  0.034  0.035  -0.008 
  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
Banks per capita  1002  1266  927.8  1340* 
  (743.4)  (1386)  (1356)  (722.0) 
Lagged tariff  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.005** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 










Constant  10.320***  7.465***  8.933***  8.853*** 
  (0.933)  (1.276)  (1.265)  (0.919) 
State  by  sector  (rural/ 
urban) by year effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2  digit  industry  by  year 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  302304  303028  303028  302304 
R-squared  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.29 
 
Notes: 1) Data are for years 1989, 1994 and 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered at the first stage unit level (Village in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas). 3) *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   
21Table 2 (b): Trade Liberalization, Banks and Enterprise Outcomes for Household 
Enterprises:  Marginal Effect of Tariff  
 
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 








Average banks=.000065  0.0004    
(0.002) 







75  percentile 
banks=.0001101 
-0.001   
(0.002) 






















Notes:  1) ‘Banks” refers to number of bank branches per capita. 
 
 
























Notes: 1) Data are for years 1994 and 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at 





   
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 
Ln(W) formal  0.183***  -0.0001  0.124*  0.063 
  (0.065)  (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.060) 
Ln(R) formal  0.016  0.007  0.011  0.013 
  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.022) 
Banks per capita  1477**  1874**  1502*  1898*** 
  (689.0)  (923.3)  (908.3)  (655.2) 
Lagged tariff  -0.022***  0.015***  0.002  -0.008*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 










Constant  10.97***  8.103***  9.000***  9.967*** 
  (0.685)  (0.852)  (0.798)  (0.681) 
State by sector (rural/ 
urban) by year effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2 digit industry by year 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  99900  100115  100115  99900 
R-squared  0.22  0.34  0.34  0.23 
22Table 3 (b): Trade Liberalization, Access to Credit and Enterprise Outcomes for Non-
household Enterprises: Marginal Effect of Tariff 
 
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 

































Notes:  1) ‘Banks” refers to number of bank branches per capita. 
 
 
Table 4: Trade Liberalization, Banks and Enterprise Outcomes for Household 
Enterprises with Output controls. 
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 
Ln(W) formal  -0.046  -0.031  -0.063  -0.012 
  (0.080)  (0.156)  (0.160)  (0.077) 
Ln(R) formal  -0.012  0.030  0.0147  0.003 
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
Banks per capita  1745*  5606***  5729***  1635 
  (1045)  (1779)  (1796)  (1015) 
Output per capita  -16.68***  -15.33***  -18.12***  -13.91*** 
  (3.366)  (4.504)  (4.170)  (3.547) 
Output Growth  -0.003  0.099***  0.121***  -0.025 
  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.037) 
Lagged tariff  -0.010***  0.0001  -0.002  -0.009*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Banks per capita*  -42.89**  -144.2***  -149.4***  -37.91** 
Lagged tariff  (18.30)  (33.07)  (33.95)  (18.25) 










Output Growth*Lagged tariff  0.0001  -0.001***  -0.002***  0.0003 
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Constant  8.501***  9.535***  10.93***  9.885*** 
  (1.614)  (1.645)  (0.870)  (0.829) 
State  by  sector  (rural/urban) 
by year effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2 digit industry by year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  238306  239147  239147  238306 
R-squared  0.28  0.35  0.33  0.31 
 
Notes: 1) Data are for years 1994 and 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at 
the first stage unit level (Village in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas). 3) Output per capita is scaled down 
by 100,000 and Output Growth by 1,000,000,000. 4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
   
23Table 5: Trade Liberalization, Banks and Enterprise Outcomes for Non-household 
Enterprises with Output controls. 
 
  Ln(Y)  Ln(K/L)  Ln(K)  Ln(Y/L) 
Ln(W) formal  0.186***  0.002  0.126*  0.067 
  (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.060) 
Ln(R) formal  0.016  0.010  0.016  0.010 
  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
Banks per capita  1038  1816*  1257  1647** 
  (678.2)  (957.0)  (928.7)  (652.1) 
Output per capita  -10.17***  -2.288  -3.367  -9.107*** 
  (2.850)  (2.335)  (2.382)  (2.390) 
Output Growth  0.083***  0.0008  0.031  0.053** 
  (0.0250)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Lagged tariff  -0.024***  0.014***  0.0008  -0.011*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Banks per capita*  -13.19  -13.99  -3.078  -25.14** 
Lagged tariff  (12.02)  (14.75)  (14.50)  (11.34) 
Output per capita*  0.229***  0.060  0.076  0.213*** 
Lagged tariff  (0.069)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Output Growth*  -0.001***  -0.0001  -0.0006*  -0.0007** 
Lagged tariff  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Constant  11.12***  8.423***  9.066***  10.08*** 
  (0.691)  (0.790)  (0.790)  (0.685) 
State  by  sector  (rural/urban)  by 
year effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2 digit industry by year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  99541  99754  99754  99541 
R-squared  0.22  0.34  0.34  0.23 
 
Notes: 1) Data are for years 1994 and 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at 
the first stage unit level (Village in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas). 3) Output per capita is scaled down 
by 100,000 and Output Growth by 1,000,000,000. 4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   
24Table 6 (a): Trade Liberalization, Banks and Outsourcing: Linear Probability Model 
 
  HH  NHH 
 
  Dummy = 1 if enterprise 
sells to another 
enterprise/contractor or 
on contract to sell mainly 
to another private 
enterprise 
Dummy = 1 if enterprise 
sells to another 
enterprise/contractor or 
on contract to sell mainly 
to another private 
enterprise 
Banks per capita  568.1  83.88 
  (850.1)  (362.6) 
Lagged tariff  -0.005***  -0.007*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Banks per capita*Lagged tariff  -7.626  -1.087 
  (17.90)  (7.944) 
Constant  0.496***  0.793*** 
  (0.109)  (0.123) 
State  by  sector  (rural/urban) 
effects 
Yes  Yes 
2 digit industry effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  138161  70541 
R-squared  0.35  0.24 
 
Notes: 1) Data are for year 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the first 




Table 6 (b): Trade Liberalization, Banks and Outsourcing: Marginal Effect of Tariff 
 




  Dummy = 1 if enterprise sells 
to another 
enterprise/contractor or on 
contract to sell mainly to 
another private enterprise 
Dummy = 1 if enterprise sells 
to another 
enterprise/contractor or on 
contract to sell mainly to 













75 percentile banks 













Notes:  1) ‘Banks” refers to number of bank branches per capita. 
 
 
   
25Table 7: Trade Liberalization, Banks and Outsourcing with Output controls: Linear 
Probability Model 
 
  HH  NHH 
 
  Dummy = 1 if enterprise 
sells to another 
enterprise/contractor or 
on contract to sell mainly 
to another private 
enterprise 
Dummy = 1 if enterprise 
sells to another 
enterprise/contractor or 
on contract to sell mainly 
to another private 
enterprise 
Banks per capita  426.2  -112.5 
  (856.8)  (361.8) 
Output per capita  1.665  1.249 
  (1.635)  (1.098) 
Output Growth  0.036*  0.019 
  (0.021)  (0.028) 
Lagged tariff  -0.004**  -0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Banks per capita*Lagged tariff  -5.069  1.111 
  (18.72)  (7.912) 
Output per capita*Lagged tariff  -0.034  -0.028 
  (0.039)  (0.026) 
Output Growth*Lagged tariff  -0.0007  -0.00004 
  (0.0005)  (0.0007) 
Constant  0.430***  0.758*** 
  (0.010)  (0.124) 
State  by  sector  (rural/urban) 
effects 
Yes  Yes 
2 digit industry effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations  138096  70501 
R-squared  0.35  0.25 
 
Notes: 1) Data are for years 1994 and 2000. 2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at 
the first stage unit level (Village in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas). 3) Output per capita is scaled down 
by 100,000 and Output Growth by 1,000,000,000. 4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
26Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
 
Enterprise demand is given by  where   is the exogenous tariff rate on 
output,   is quantity,   is the industry average output price and   is the price charged by the 
enterprise. 
                (A.1) 
 
 
The enterprise maximizes profit 
 
    (A.2) 
 
 
Where   is the cost faced by the enterprise,   is the wage rate and   is bank presence 
in the district in which the enterprise is located, both exogenous to the enterprise. Bank presence 
is associated with lower enterprise cost since it lowers the rental rate of capital   and because it 
generates agglomeration economies.   and   are partial derivatives of the cost function with 
respect to   and  respectively,   is marginal cost for fixed   and  ,   is the partial 
derivative of   with respect to  and   is the partial derivative of  with respect to  . 
 
Assuming an interior solution, profit maximization occurs when 
 
          (A.3) 
yielding 
                  (A.4) 
 
 
Proposition 1: As long as , there exists a value of bank presence, say   such 
that for  < ,   and for  ,  . 
 
27Differentiating the first order condition with respect to  : 
 




 Since   and  the sign of this expression depends on the sign of the 
numerator. 
 
      (A.6) 
 
This means that the change in marginal revenue due to a change in the tariff is different for 
different values of . With a fall in the tariff, there is a fall in  if: 
 
          (A.7) 
 




For values of   higher than the left hand side, a fall in the tariff is associated with an increase in 
. At   
 




Now   if 
 
or                      (A.9) 
 
Intuitively, this condition requires that with a fall in the tariff, the new   curve intersects the 
old   curve in the first quadrant if the proportionate change in the slope of the   curve is 
larger than the proportionate change in the intercept. In other words, the flattening effect of the 
tariff fall on the   curve dominates the downward shift.  
 
Then,  if  ,  there  exists   = >0and 
corresponding   such  that  for > ,  <0  and  <0  and  for < , 
>0 and  >0 .  
Also, differentiating the FOC with respect to  , 
 
            (A.10) 
 
and hence 
since  .          (A.11) 
If   is the value of bank presence for which   is the optimal quantity, for  < ,  <  and 
>0 and for  , > ,   <0 . 
 
 
   
29Proposition 2:   < 0. 
Differentiating the expression for   with respect to  ,  
 
  (A.12) 
 
assuming   to  be  small  (since  it  is  a  third-order  derivative),
. 
 
   
30Appendix B: Data  
 
All data are for the years 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-01 except when noted. 
 
Unorganized  Enterprise  data  (Unorganized  Manufacturing,  National  Sample  Survey 
Organization, India): 
Level of Observation: Enterprise level. 
Capital and Output: The market value of fixed assets andthe value of output and gross 
value added in rupees deflated by the whole sale price index for all commodities for the Indian 
economy  from  the  Office  of  Economic  Advisors,  Government  of  India, 
http://eaindustry.nic.in/asp2/list_d.asp  with  base  year  1993-94are  my  measures  of  physical 
capital and output for the enterprise.I drop enterprises with total employment<=0, value of 
materials<0, fixed assets<0, gross output<0 or employment<20 from the sample. 
Labor:  The average number of workers both household and hired, working full time and 
part time, in the last month of the year ismy measure of employment. 
Outsourcing (only for 2000-01): Dummy variable that is coded as 1 if an enterprise sells its 
output to another enterprise or a contractor or if the enterprise is on a contract to sell most of its 
output to another enterprise.  
 
Level of Observation: District in an urban/rural sector of a state 
Total Output Per Capita: Total enterprise output divided by population
1. 
Growth in output: Change in enterprise output between current year and previous NSS round 
year. 
 
Formal  sector  data  on  factor  prices  (Annual  Survey  of  Industries,  Central  Statistical 
Organization, India):  
Level of Observation: 2 digit NIC 1998 industry in each state. 
Wage rate: Total emoluments for the year deflated by the whole sale price index of all 
commodities for the economy divided by the total number of employees in the industry in each 
state is my measure of the annual wage rate. 
                                                           
1 Total output and number of enterprises at district level are sums of output and number of enterprises 
including all household enterprises and non-household enterprises hiring less than 6 workers since data 
for these enterprises is available for 1989, 1994 and 2000 while data for enterprises hiring between 6 and 
10 workers is available only for 1994 and 2000. 
31Rental rate: Total rent paid on fixed assets divided by the book value of total fixed assets 
in the industry in that state is my measure of the annual rental rate. 
Bank  data  (Basic  Statistical  Returns,  Reserve  Bank  of  India  and  Indian  Population 
Census (1991, 2001), Central Statistical Organization, India): 
Observation level: Rural or Urban area in a district in a state. 
Banks per capita (rural or urban): The number of rural and urban branches of all scheduled 
commercial banks in India in the district divided by population. Scheduled commercial banks 
include regional rural banks, co-operative banks, public sector banks and private sector banks.  
 
Normalization of bank branches: 
I normalize banks with population from the 1991 census for the 1989 and 1994 rounds of my 
data. For the 2000 round, enterprises are classified as urban or rural based on the 1991 census. 
However, I argue that using the 1991 census populations to normalize banks for the 2000 round 
might be outdated. I cannot use population figures for the urban and rural sectors of a district 
from the 2001 population directly since rural sectors in some districts in the 1991 census and 
hence my 2000 NSS round may be urban sectors in the 2001 census. Hence for the 2000 round, 
I create populations for the rural and urban sectors of a district by taking their population in 
1991 and allowing them to grow between 1991 and 2001 at the rate of growth of population for 
the entire district. Second, the NSS classification of an enterprise into rural or urban is based on 
the 1991 census for the 1994 round. However, the bank data from the Reserve Bank of India 
classifies areas as rural or urban based on their populations in the 1981 Population Census for 
the 1994 round. Hence, for the year 1994, the NSS enterprise data classification of a firm as 
urban or rural may not correspond with the rural or urban number of bank branches associated 
with it if there have been changes in the classification of a village as a town. However, my results 
using  total  district  variables  instead  of  splitting  them  into  urban  or  rural  performed  as  a 
robustness check address this issue.  
 
Districts: 
Since  each  unorganized  manufacturing  enterprise  survey  round  incorporates  newly  formed 
districts, I code newly formed districts back to the original district in 1989. Sometimes, a new 
district is formed out of twoor more old districts. In this case, I add the two or more old districts 
and form a consolidated 1989 ‘super-district’. 
 
   
32Output tariff data (Asian Development Bank, Manila): 
Observation level: Commodity level aggregated to 3 digit NIC 1998. 
Lagged Tariff: I construct output tariffs at the 3 digit NIC 1998 level by assigning each 
commodity  to  its  corresponding  3  digit  NIC  1998  code.  In  cases  where  more  than  one 
commodity corresponds to a 3 digit NIC 1998 code, the output tariff for that NIC 1998 industry 
is constructed as a simple average of the tariffs for the corresponding commodities. For 3 digit 
NIC 1998 industries with no corresponding commodity, I assign the 2 digit NIC 1998 tariff, 
where the 2 digit NIC 1998 tariffs are simple averages of tariffs of commodities assigned to that 
2 digit industry. I then lag the tariffs by one year. 
Industry Concordance: 
All my data are concorded to the 2 digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) 1998. For the 
Unorganized Enterprise data, this meant writing a concordance between 4digit NIC 1987 and 2 
digit NIC 1998. My ASI formal sector data were obtained at the 3digit industry level, classified 
under NIC 1987 for the years 1989-90 and 1994-00 and under NIC 1998 for the year 2000-01. 
Hence I had to write a concordance to transfer the 3 digit NIC 1987 1989-90 and 1994-95 ASI 
data to 2digit NIC 1998. First, if a 3 digit NIC 1987 industry corresponded to more than one 
3digit NIC 1998 industry, I assigned the same wage and rental rate to all 3NIC 1998 industries. 
Next, I took a simple average of the wage and rental rate and wage-rental ratio of the 3digit NIC 
1998 industries to get the corresponding NIC 1998 2digit industry wage and rental rates. 
33